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Generating Voting Rules from Random Relations
Extended Abstract
Nic Wilson




We consider a way of generating voting rules based on a random
relation, the winners being alternatives that have the highest proba-
bility of being supported. We consider different notions of support,
such as whether an alternative dominates the other alternatives, or
whether an alternative is undominated, and we consider structural
assumptions on the form of the random relation, such as being
acyclic, asymmetric, connex or transitive. We give sufficient con-
ditions on the supporting function for the associated voting rule
to satisfy various properties such as Pareto and monotonicity. The
random generation scheme involves a parameter p between zero
and one. Further voting rules are obtained by tending p to zero, and
by tending p to one, and these limiting rules satisfy a homogeneity
property, and, in certain cases, Condorcet consistency. We define a
language of supporting functions based on eight natural properties,
and categorise the different rules that can be generated for the
limiting p cases.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We develop in this paper a framework for aggregating multi-agent
preferences, including many interesting instances (i.e., different
aggregation methods), based on a novel probabilistic model. Our
approach involves using a weighted relation v to pick a random
binary preference relation between alternatives. The numerical
support for an alternative x is the chance that the randomly picked
relation R (logically) supports x , i.e., Pr(R ∈ Spx ), where Spx is
defined to be the set of relations that support x . The output is the
set of winners, i.e., the set of alternatives with maximal numerical
support. Many different notions of logical support are possible,
leading to different definitions of Spx .
Randomly generating relation R
Let A be a finite set of alternatives. Define ∆ to be the set of pairs
(x,y) with x , y. A subset R of ∆ is thus an irreflexive binary rela-
tion onA. We defineV to be the set of all functionsv from ∆ to the
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non-negative reals. An elementv ofV will be intended to represent
some degree of preference for alternative x over alternativey. For in-
stance, in a voting scenario, it could represent the number of voters
preferring x to y. We generate a random irreflexive binary relation
R, based on parameter p ∈ (0, 1), as follows. For each (x,y) ∈ ∆
we (independently) omit (x,y) from R with chance (1 −p)v(x ,y), so
the probability that R contains (x,y) equals 1− (1−p)v(x ,y). Based
on this, the chance Prvp ({R}) that the randomly chosen relation is




(1 − (1 − p)v(x ,y)) ×
∏
(x ,y)∈∆\R
(1 − p)v(x ,y).
Example 1.1. Consider the set of alternatives A = {a,b, c,d} and
v ∈ V represented by the following table, with e.g., v(a,b) = 5; v
may, for example, arise from a profile with eight voters: two voters
with preference order a > b > c > d , and three voters with each of
a > b > d > c and c > b > d > a.
v(x,y) a b c d
a − 5 5 5
b 3 − 5 8
c 3 3 − 5
d 3 0 3 −
Let R = Ob = {(b,a), (b, c), (b,d)}. Let q = 1 − p and let r =∑
(x ,y)∈∆\Ob v(x,y) = 32. Then Pr
v
p ({R}) equals (1 − q
v(b ,a))(1 −
qv(b ,c))(1 − qv(b ,d ))qr , i.e., (1 − q3)(1 − q5)(1 − q8)q32. ✷
Defining winners, given p ∈ (0, 1)
A supporting function Sp associates a set of relations Spx (⊆ 2
∆
)
with each alternative x inA. Givenv ∈ V and a value p ∈ (0, 1), we
consider, for each alternative x , the probability Prvp (Spx ) of Spx , i.e.,∑
R∈Spx Pr
v
p ({R}). This generates a social choice rule in the obvious
way: we defineW
Sp
p (v) to be the set of alternatives x that maximise
Pr
v
p (Spx ), so that x ∈ W
Sp
p (v) if and only if for all alternatives y,
Pr
v
p (Spx ) ≥ Pr
v
p (Spy ).
Two basic supporting functions, Opt and U
We say that x is dominating in relation R if R contains the set Ox =
{(x,y) : y , x}, so that x is preferred to every other alternative
with respect to preference relation R. We say that the supporting
function Sp satisfies the property Opt if Spx only contains relations
R in which x is dominating. In this case, R supports x only if x
is dominating in relation R. We say that Sp satisfies property U if
R ∈ Spx implies x is undominated in R, i.e., R ∩ Dx = ∅, where
Dx = {(y, x) : y , x}, so no alternative dominates x .
Example 1.1 continued: Suppose we define Spx to beUx for x ∈ A;
with this definition, relation R supports b if and only if b is not
dominated in R, i.e., there exists no pair of the form (x,b) in R.
In other words, R ∈ Spb if and only if R ⊆ ∆ \ Db , where Db =




p ({R}), which can be
shown to be equal to
∏
ψ ∈Db q
v(ψ ) = qs where s =
∑
ψ ∈Db v(ψ ) =
8. Similarly, Prvp (Ua ) = q
9
, Prvp (Uc ) = q
13
, and Prvp (Ud ) = q
18
. This
shows that whatever value is chosen for p ∈ (0, 1), b is the unique
winner, since it has the highest probability of being supported:
Prvp (Ub ) > Pr
v
p (Ux ) for x , b. In fact, Proposition 1.2 below implies
that Spx = Ux generates the Borda voting rule for any value of p.
Suppose we instead define Spx to be Ux ∩ Optx for all x ∈ A.
Now Spx contains all relations R in which (i) x is undominated
and (ii) x dominates the other alternatives. It can be shown that
Prvp (Spb ) = (1 − q
3)(1 − q5)(1 − q8)q8 and Prvp (Spa ) = (1 − q
5)3q9.
With e.g., p = 0.5, this makes b the unique winner; in fact, b is
the unique winner unless p is very small (less than around 0.0693),
when a becomes the winner. ✷
We consider sufficient conditions for desirable properties on the
voting rule. In particular, if Sp satisfies both Opt and U then we
show that the voting rule satisfies natural monotonicity and Pareto
properties. This therefore gives a method for generating a large
family of voting (and other aggregation) rules that have some good
properties.
Further supporting functions
As well as properties Opt and U we consider a weaker form TOpt
of property Opt, (relating to whether x is dominating in the tran-
sitive closure of R) and OOpt, which means that, for R ∈ Spx , R
only contains elements of the form (x, z), i.e., R ⊆ Ox . We also
consider structural properties that restrict the form of the relation:
asymmetry, acyclicity, connex, and transitivity properties. We con-
sider a simple language L of logical support, based on these eight
properties, with a supporting function being generated by a subset
of the eight properties.
When the winners do not depend on p
The following result shows special cases in which the winner is
independent of the value p ∈ (0, 1), in particular the case when
Spx = Ux and the case when Spx = OOptx .
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that for each x ∈ A, Spx is of the form
{R : R ⊆ Sx } for some Sx ⊆ ∆. Then, Prvp (Spx ) = (1 − p)
v+(∆) ×
(1 − p)−v
+(Sx ), and x ∈W Spp (v) if and only if x ∈ argmaxzv
+(Sz ).
In particular, we have x ∈W Up (v) if and only if x ∈ argminzv
+(Dz ),
and x ∈W OOptp (v) if and only if x ∈ argmaxzv
+(Oz ).
Tending p → 1 or p → 0
Away to ensure a homogeneity property (inwhich a linear rescaling
of the input v makes no difference) is to consider the result of
tending p to either 1 or 0. We show that the set of winners is still
always non-empty and that we obtain somewhat simpler structures
determining the voting rules.
We completely characterise the voting rules for the language L,
for the p → 0 case, and for the p → 1 case in which v is non-zero,
leading to seven different voting rules in each case. We show, in
particular, that the p → 1 cases lead to a number of well-known
voting rules: Borda, the Kemeny rule, Tideman’s rule, and maximin.
2 RELATEDWORK
The input v ∈ V of a V-rule can be viewed as a weighted directed
graph on alternatives, with non-negative real weights; this suggests
the potential of relationships with weighted tournament solutions,
C2 functions in the Fishburn’s classification [6, 7]. In particular,
in certain cases, there is a correspondence between the (p → 1)-
winners and the winners according to a voting rule generated by
median orders [1, 6, 8].
There are also some links between between (p → 1) cases and
voting rules generated fromMaximumLikelihood Estimators (MLE),
and consensus-based voting rules [2, 3, 5], since the maximin rule
can be generated, as well as Borda. In a general sense, our ap-









tr in [5], and they can
give similar rules to the p → 1 rules generated with our framework.
However, even when they do, the tie-breaking can be very different
from the winners in our framework, as illustrated on pages 190 and
191 of [5], which suggests that there is not a simple correspondence
between the different frameworks.
3 DISCUSSION
We have defined and explored a framework for generating voting
rules (and V-rules that allow a general form of input), based on
winners being alternatives that maximise the probability of being
supported. We have given some simple sufficient conditions for
certain properties of the voting rule. We defined a simple language
of supporting functions, and categorised the rules generated for
the two limiting cases with p → 0/1.
Our method allows one to generate large (and continuous) fami-
lies of voting rules that satisfy some good properties. In particular,
if we choose some neutral Sp based on (arbitrarily complicated)
sets of relations and add the conditions Opt and U then we ob-
tain neutral V-rules, and thus also voting rules (using an arbitrary
strictly monotonic non-zero function of the positive reals), that
satisfy Pareto and monotonicity properties. Homogeneity of the
voting rule can be enforced by an additional normalisation step. If
we additionally consider p → 1 and restrict to asymmetric relations
then the voting rule will satisfy the Condorcet property.
For the limiting p → 1 case, it is striking that several well-
known voting rules can be generated by choosing different natural
choices of the supporting function, including Borda, maximin, the
Kemeny rule and Tideman’s rule. Therefore, as well as generating
new voting rules, the approach gives a new perspective on standard
rules, and it would be interesting to pursue a view of the framework
as a rationalisation of certain classes of voting rules [4, 5].
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